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Abstract— When more and more people recognize the value of 
volatile data, live forensics gains more weight in digital forensics. 
It is often used in parallel with traditional pull-the-plug forensics 
to provide a more reliable result in forensic examination. One of 
the core components in live forensics is the collection and analysis 
of memory volatile data, during which the memory content is 
acquired for searching of relevant evidential data or investigating 
various computer processes to unveil the activities being 
performed by a user. However, this conventional method may 
have weaknesses because of the volatile nature of memory data 
and the absence of original data for validation. This may cause 
implication to the admissibility of memory data at the court of 
law which requires strict authenticity and reliability of evidence. 
In this paper, we discuss the impact of various memory 
acquisition methods and suggest a 2-Take approach which aims 
to enhance the confidence level of the acquired memory data for 
legal proceedings. 
Keywords— memory forensics, memory acquisition, live 
forensics 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the conventional approach, we analyze computer 
memory by preserving its content via dumping of data from the 
physical memory [2, 4, 6]. Data searching or carving will then 
be performed on the acquired memory snapshot for locating 
any meaningful information therein [9, 10]. There also exist 
various kinds of methodology to the reconstruction of memory 
process data [11, 12] to assist computer forensic examiners in 
better understanding the activities of a computer user. Very 
often, the examination of memory data involved the collection 
of a single memory snapshot at specific time. The integrity of 
preserved memory data could not be verified due to the ever-
changing internal statuses and volatile nature of the data [14]. 
Unlike traditional computer forensics which allows verification 
of the acquired image against the original data, memory 
forensics could be considered as a one-off examination 
whereas the integrity of data relies on the techniques and tools 
that are used at the memory acquisition process. With 
technology advancement and price-down of Random Access 
Memory (RAM), computer memory nowadays becomes 
another data storage location which is highly likely to contain 
evidential data that does not exist on the computer hard drive. 
The ruling of the Columbia v Bunnell, 2007 WL 2080419 [1] 
case from the US District court further suggested that memory 
content were “electronically stored information” that could be 
used in court proceedings. However, the traditional concept of 
“forensically sound” duplicate [16] is no longer applicable to 
memory image and this may require a new legal definition for 
memory data before it could be fully admissible at the court of 
laws. Prior to the creation of such new concept for the current 
legislation, which is often a lengthy process, there is a need to 
address the admissibility issue of memory data.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
gives the literature review of the current technologies and 
practices on memory forensics. Experimental results for 
various memory acquisition methods and the analysis of 
acquired memory data are presented in Section 3. Then, we 
propose a new approach for memory acquisition in Section 4. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In these years, the concept of memory forensics is evolving 
in the field of computer forensics. A lot of research has been 
conducted in this area with a view to search for viable ways to 
enhance the effectiveness in the collection and analysis of 
memory data. Farmer and Venema pointed out the major 
problem faced in memory analysis is the great variation in the 
internals of how memory is implemented on various operating 
systems [17]. 
Based on different user requirements, a number of live 
incident response tools have been developed to address the 
needs [2, 3]. Existing toolkits are often automated programs to 
be run on the target live system to collect volatile data at the 
physical memory, whilst the collected data are often 
recommended to be stored at external storage device to 
minimize the change to the original system [18]. The credibility 
of the acquired data relies solely on the reliability of the tool 
and the expertise of the user. If the tool is run on a 
compromised system, the integrity of the collected data could 
hardly be secured [4]. Some tools may even substantially alter 
the digital environment of the original system and cause an 
adverse impact to the preserved memory data. As a result, it is 
often required to study the effect of running such tools and 
determine if the alterations would affect the acquired data [5, 
19].  
Carrier and Grand pointed out the potential flaws in 
acquiring volatile data via the original system and proposed a 
hardware-based approach for making an accurate and reliable 
copy of volatile memory contents [4]. Its purpose is to avoid 
the volatile data being compromised by untrusted code from 
the operating system or other applications. Antonio further 
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discussed the problems when acquiring live data via a network-
based model and suggested using Firewire devices to acquire 
memory data through the Direct Memory Access (DMA) 
controller [6]. J. Alex et al. even experimented to retrieve data 
from physical DRAM via cold boot attack and successfully 
recovered encryption keys from memory content [20]. There 
are also suggestions to obtain the image of memory via system 
hibernation [22] or system crash [23]. Basically, the operating 
environment and hardware configuration determine which tools 
and methods to be used and how effectively the methods are in 
computer forensic analysis of memory [24].  
There are many memory researches focus on the proper 
methods or techniques that should be used in data acquisition 
and analysis of memory data, few of them discuss the way to 
verify the integrity and reliability of retrieved evidential data 
that may be used for legal proceedings. It is generally accepted 
that the key in validating the authenticity and integrity of data 
rests with the acquisition process. Provided the acquisition 
process preserves a complete and accurate representation of the 
original data [21], together with a good documentation, the data 
extracted from such acquired image should be forensically 
sound.  The ruling in Lorraine v Market American Insurance 
Company, 2007 WL 1300739 [25] laid out the requirements on 
the admissibility of digital evidence and emphasize the 
importance of authentication to the data. The United States 
Department of Justice also pointed out the main challenge for 
the admission of digital evidence is authenticity [26]. It is 
therefore important to have a methodology to aid computer 
forensic examiners in memory acquisition process to ensure 
memory data collected could be verified. 
III. EXPERIMENTS 
The focus of this paper is to explore the way to enhance the 
confidence level of memory data acquired from live computer 
memory. In the following experiments, we are going to 
evaluate the data change in memory snapshots collected 
continuously to study the effect of running different memory 
acquisition tools on the computer memory content. 
The testing platform consists of a Windows XP Service 
Pack 2 machine running on an Intel Pentium 4 3.0 GHz CPU 
with 512mb of RAM. The virtual memory is set to the default 
system managed size setting and a firewire interface card is 
installed on the testing platform to allow direct memory access 
to the memory. We set up a Windows 2003 Service Pack 2 
server on a network to provide accessible web resources to the 
testing platform. 
A. Physical Memory Acquisition 
The first experiment relates to the testing of different kinds 
of memory acquisition tools that could be used for collecting 
memory snapshots. The purpose of the experiment is to assess 
to what extent a tool would tamper the memory content during 
the acquisition process. To simulate a dynamic environment, 
we collected multiple memory snapshots from the testing 
platform in the context of downloading a large text file from a 
Windows server via the File Transfer Protocol (FTP) program 
came along with the Windows System. Apart from the FTP 
process, none of the tasks was run by the user. There were a 
total of twenty-one memory processes running on the system. 
In the controlled environment, the memory content was 
acquired by the tools listed in Table 1. A total of ten physical 
memory snapshots were collected one by one immediately after 
the previous dumping process. An external USB hard drive was 
used to save the dumped memory images. The time gap 
between two consecutive dumps was around 20 seconds Every 
two dumps were analyzed in the way that each byte in one 
dump was compared with the corresponding byte in the other 
dump. After the testing of an individual tool, the system was 
rebooted.  The FTP program would be initiated again to 
download the text file, another acquisition tool would then run 
on the testing platform and perform the same procedure. Table 
1 shows the results of the experiment. 
TABLE I.  TESTING RESULT OF MEMORY ACQUISITION TOOLS (MEMORY 
USAGE IS MEASURED IN KB) 
Tools 
Avg. 
Memory 
Usage 
Peak 
Memory 
Usage 
Avg. 
Virtual 
Memory 
Usage 
Peak 
Memory 
Usage 
Avg. % 
change 
between 
memory 
images 
Nigilant32[26] 3300 6836 920 2272 50.8% 
Memdump [27] 2836 3425 1156 1204 45.8% 
MemDD [28] 2238 2250 49 52 39.0% 
FauDD [29] 1544 1544 470 472 50.9% 
KntDD [30] 5104 5152 1952 2452 3.6% 
Win32DD[31] 1168 1168 292 294 47.4% 
X-Ways Capture [32] 1624 1636 444 444 49.4% 
F-Response [33] 
 
3720
  
4508 1956 3260 6.1% 
Memoryze [34] 7912 10052 4764 4792 55.6% 
1394memimage* [35] NA NA NA NA 2.3% 
* The 1394memimage tool access computer memory through DMA and does not create any memory 
process at the testing platform. 
It is observed that some memory tools cause less impact to 
the collected memory content. Some memory acquisition tools 
are more invasive than the others and their general alterations 
to the memory image content collected at various time intervals 
are over 35% on average. After comparing the individual 
imaged memory content, we discovered that some of the 
acquisition tools had shuffled the memory data in the context of 
memory dumping, causing movement of data to the content of 
consequent acquired snapshots. 
It is worthy to note that software acquisition tools cause 
more changes to the memory images than the hardware 
approach. Should the software acquisition tools fail to acquire 
the memory image at the first attempt, it should be aware that 
the original content of memory data may be changed. Though 
the hardware acquisition method has very little intrusiveness, it 
would easily crash the target system. 
It is interested to note that there exists persistent data at the 
memory images which could be identified at consecutive 
dumps. These kinds of persistent data could be validated 
between consecutive memory images and the integrity of data 
found within these areas could be assured. 
B. Logical Memory Process Acquisition 
Similar experiments in Section 3.1 were conducted on a 
number of common dynamic/static memory processes to 
observe any implications by the memory acquisition tools. 
Given that there are not many tools in the market specifically 
designed to dump logical process memory, we have tested 
pmdump [13], and X-Ways Capture in the experiment. Table 2 
shows the percentages of data change in logical memory 
process dumps collected by various tools. 
TABLE II.  TESTING RESULT OF LOGICAL MEMORY ACQUISITION 
Process Size of memory process dump (mb) 
Average % change between 
images 
pmdump X-Ways capture 
System 0.8 0.0001% 0.0001% 
Smss.exe 1.0 0.021% 0.0019% 
Services.exe 34.2 0.0063% 0.0078% 
Winlogon.exe 33.0 0.0068% 0.0072% 
ftp.exe 25.5 4.95% 5.1% 
Iexplore.exe* 68.3 8.3% 7.9% 
Msnmsgr.exe* 46.6 3.6% 3.9% 
* The percentage of change is calculated with respect to the size of the latest memory dump 
It is observed that the percentage of difference is relatively 
small, suggesting that only a little portion of data was changing 
in the context of logical memory process acquisition. It seems 
that logical memory acquisition caused fewer changes to the 
memory content when compared with the physical memory 
acquisition, suggesting logical memory acquisition tools are 
less invasive. With the existence of large amount of persistent 
data, the chance of extracting reliable memory data should be 
much higher than physical memory acquisition. 
By analyzing consecutive memory process snapshots, the 
major data changing area was identified. Fig. 1 demonstrates 
the location of that portion in the process memory dump. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Memory buffer map of a process memory dump against a FTP 
program 
It is believed that the identified portion of data is the 
memory buffer of the FTP program that is used for handling 
dynamic data received from the server. The file being 
downloaded from the server side is a text file with content 
extracted from a story book. We have examined the content at 
the memory buffer location of each memory process snapshot 
and successfully identified the corresponding content of the 
downloaded text file. Similar experiments were conducted on 
Internet Explorer version 7 as well as Windows Live 
Messenger when the subject text file was transferred between 
the testing platform and another computer host. Very similar 
results have been obtained, suggesting that we should be able 
to differentiate both the persistent and dynamic data area within 
a memory process snapshot. 
IV. FORENSICALLY SOUND MEMORY ACQUISITION 
There are many definitions on “forensically sound” 
duplicate when performing the traditional disk-to-disk imaging 
from “dead” computer system. However, from the above 
experiments, the acquisition of memory data is very likely to 
change the memory content and the traditional definition seems 
not to be applicable nowadays. 
From the experimental results, it is suggested that there 
exists persistent memory content at consecutive memory 
snapshots. The data recovered from this persistent area may be 
verified and could be more trustworthy than the remaining 
dynamic and inconsistent memory content in the unmatched 
areas. When evidential digital data is retrieved in these 
consistent areas, its reliability could be higher than the 
remaining data at the same acquired image. However, one 
should note that memory dumps should be collected in short 
time intervals or the consistent data area would be insignificant 
due to the dynamic nature of the memory [5]. 
A. The 2-Take Method 
Though obtaining multiple memory snapshots could 
achieve the purpose of data authentication on memory data, it 
can be tedious and time-consuming in practice. To compass a 
similar effect, a 2-Take method for memory acquisition is 
suggested. In a physical crime scene, a forensic specialist will 
first take a picture of the evidence to be collected, followed by 
the actual evidence collection. We believe such two-step 
approach could be adopted in digital evidence collection at 
computer memory: 
1. Take a first snapshot of the current memory content to be 
used for future verification. 
2. Take a second snapshot of the memory content to be used 
for computer forensics examination. 
To achieve this, the time interval between the two memory 
snapshots to be obtained should be kept as small as possible. 
The snapshots are then compared to identify the persistent data 
set in which the data recovered in these areas could be 
validated on its accuracy and completeness. Since the 
evidential data recovered from these areas could be 
authenticated, it is considered to be forensically sound and 
could be presented to the court of law as evidence. For data 
recovered from the remaining dynamic data area, it relies on 
the conventional memory forensic methodology, i.e. the 
assurance of the forensic examiner who acquired the memory 
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image, to prove its reliability. In any case, to decide the most 
appropriate approach in collecting memory data from a running 
computer, the examiner should take into account the effect of 
various memory acquisition tools and circumstances at live 
investigation scene. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Memory forensics is obviously one of the core parts in live 
forensics investigation and it is foreseeable that more and more 
evidential data will be resided in memory in future. During 
conventional live memory investigation, one can only rely on 
documentation, the tools used by computer forensic examiners 
as well as the examiners’ expertise to ensure the authenticity 
and reliability of the acquired memory data. However, the 
current practice in obtaining a single memory snapshot may be 
subject to challenge by the defense since the integrity of data 
could not be verified. In order to utilize memory data in legal 
proceedings, we must ensure the memory data collected are 
reliable and could be authenticated. In this paper, we observe 
the possibility of using two memory snapshots to enhance the 
reliability of acquired memory data via the identification of 
persistent data within consecutive memory dumps. It provides 
sources of authentication so that the confidence level of using 
the acquired memory data at legal proceedings can be 
improved. 
Furthermore, should multiple memory snapshots be 
obtained from live computer memory, it may be able to assist 
computer forensics examiner in doing a thorough analysis on 
dynamic memory processes, especially in the analysis of 
buffering data which is transient in nature. 
The proposed 2-Take method is easy to perform in practice. 
It is hoped that such method could supplement the conventional 
memory forensic analysis by introducing another way to 
present memory data at legal proceedings. Further research 
may be conducted to investigate if it is feasible to create a tool 
for capturing memory content in a continuous manner to assist 
computer forensic examiners in studying persistent memory 
data and better understanding the information flow at the 
memory. 
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